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Abstract
The landscape of the Indonesian public sphere—amidst the rise of new media—
has opened both opportunities and threats dealing with Islamic teaching. This 
condition shapes a danger for the two largest of moderate Muslim Organisations 
(Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama/NU), in which they do not engage much 
of the development of the digital platform. Consequently, dealing with religious 
issues, they become voiceless. By employing desk research with some relevant 
references and collecting information from social media, specifically Instagram 
and Youtube, this article examines the role of the Islamic organization of moderate 
Islam in the rapid digital platform as the new public sphere. The article finds 
that they have differences in responding to dealing with the presence of the new 
religious authorities. In comparison, while Muhammadiyah is more accepting of 
them calmly, NU is more reactively in responding.
Lanskap ruang publik Indonesia di tengah muncunya media sosial membuka 
kesempatan sekaligus ancaman terkait dengan dakwah Islam. Hal itu merupakan 
ancaman bagi dua organisasi besar Moderat Islam di Indonesia (Muhammadiyah 
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dan NU), di mana mereka menjadi kelompok minoritas dalam aktivitas dakwah 
online. Akibatnya, berkaitan dengan issu-isu keagamaan, suara mereka menjadi 
tidak terdengar/didengarkan. Dengan melakukan riset studi literatur yang relevan 
dan informasi yang didapatkan dari akun media sosial, khususnya Instagram 
dan Youtube, artikel ini menjelaskan peranan organisasi Islam moderat di 
tengah cepatnya platform digital di ruang publik. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa 
Muhammadiyah dan NU memiliki respon yang berbeda terkait dengan kehadiran 
otoritas keagamaan baru. Sebagai perbandingan, penerimaan Muhammadiyah 
terhadap kehadiran mereka lebih biasa ketimbang dengan NU yang reaktif. 
Keywords: Moderate Islam; 212 movement; New religious authorities; Social media
Introduction
The events of Islamic mobilization to insist that Basuki Tjahaya Purnama 
(Ahok) go to jail due to the accusation of the Al-Quran blasphemy on his 
speech in Kepulauan Seribu Jakarta on September 27th, 2016 create the 
pivotal juncture on religious authority in Indonesia. Not only were the 
most significant events attended by a diversity of Indonesian Muslims 
but they were also questioning the presence of moderate Islam that 
has been dominated by the two largest Muslim organizations in years, 
Muhammadiyah and NU. Being well-known, both organizations formally 
appealed to their members not to join the events. There are some reasons 
why they asked them not to attend.1 Instead of following their instructions, 
1For the PBNU Chairman, Said Agil Sirajd, the event was not understood very well for 
their members, so it was better to avoid and stay away from it, while the police officer had 
handled this case. Indeed, to strengthen this appealing, the PBNU’s people issued the ban of 
Jum’at praying on the main road due to disturbing the interests of other public that employ it. 
For the Muhammadiyah Chairman, Haedar Nashir, the event was not only useless but also it 
had been exploited by the agenda of the Islamic radical group that tried to break the Islamic 
solidarity (Memecah Belah Umat). Republika.co.id, “PBNU Terbitkan Fatwa Larangan Salat 
Jumat di Jalan Raya”, in https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/16/11/24/
oh4wqf382-pbnu-terbitkan-fatwa-larangan-shalat-jumat-di-jalan-raya, accessed 1 July 2019; 
Okezone.com, “Tanggapi Aksi 212, Said Aqil: Boleh Ikut Tapi Jangan Bawa Atribut NU”, 
3
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many of their members then joined the events while those demonstrations 
had continued at least five times, mainly November 4th, 2016, December 
2nd, 2016, February 21st,  2017, March 3rd, 2017, and May 5th, 2017. 
In comparison to those demonstrations, the two events at the beginning 
were attended by the biggest Muslim organization, mainly November 
4th, 2016, that was named the 411 movements and December 2nd, 2016, 
as the 212 movements. They also call these movements Aksi Bela Islam 
(Action to defense Islam). Due to these phenomena, some scholars have a 
different response. Burhani argues that the presence of the new religious 
authorities has fragmented the power, while the presence of Rizieq Shihab 
played a pivotal role in strengthening the evidence.2 Arifianto sees this 
issue within the internal rivalries of these organizations while undergoing 
the contestation on the level of their prominent figures dealing with the 
political electoral, whether in the local, national, and presidential election.3 
Consequently, they do not have the same voices to articulate their public 
statements. However, the altering landscape of moderate Islam society to 
conservative turn has been alarming through Ricklefs with his extensive 
study on the historical reference of Islam in Java4 and Bruinessen’s work 
by identifying the growth of the new Islamic organizations during and the 
in https://news.okezone.com/read/2017/02/20/337/1623385/tanggapi-aksi-212-said-
aqil-boleh-ikut-tapi-jangan-bawa-atribut-nu, accessed 1 July 2019. CNN Indonesia.com, 
“Muhammadiyah Imbau Masyarakat Tak Ikut Aksi 212”, in https://www.cnnindonesia.com/
nasional/20170220084040-20194629/muhammadiyah-imbau-masyarakat-tak-ikut-aksi-212, 
accessed 1 July 2019. 
2Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Plural Islam and Contestation of Religious Authority in 
Indonesia”, in Islam in Southeast Asia: Negotiating Modernity, ed. Noorshahril Saat, Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2018.  
3Alexander Arifianto, “Nadhlatul Ulama is home to its own hardliners”, New Mandala,  (8 
August 2018), in http://www.newmandala.org/nadhlatul-ulama-home-hardliners/, accessed 
2 July 2019.
4MC. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious 
History, c. 1930 to Present, Singpore: NUS Press, 2012.
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post-authoritarian regime comprehensively.5  
Undoubtedly, these conditions force us to look back on Hefner’s work 
that previously predicted more optimism on the future of Indonesian 
political Islam that was broadly compatible with democracy and religious 
pluralism.6 This idea was inspired by Intellectual Muslim figures that could 
combine both Islamic knowledge tradition and its theology as well as 
modern western theory, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, and 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Not only does the foundation explain the Indonesian 
Muslim society, but this thesis also becomes “a leading framework adopted 
by scholars and policymakers alike to analyze Islam in Indonesia during 
the post-Reformasi period.”7 Therefore, some critics revisit Hefner’s works 
by redefining the willingness of both Muhammadiyah and NU as “policy 
intervention that is driven more by internal factors than by an ideological 
commitment to the civil Islam.” Additionally, there is an ambiguity of the 
organizations that are supporting the Indonesian democratic transition 
and its consolidation. However, at the same time, they also create “the ally 
with the anti-democratic actors to combat blasphemy against Islam, non-
Muslim speech on matters about the Islamic faith and non-Muslim political 
control over majority-Muslim regions of Indonesia.”8 Meanwhile, Arifianto 
specifically criticizes Hefner’s methodology of choosing the informants that 
are from the Muslim intellectual elites who had developed very well on the 
combination of Islamic tradition knowledge and modern western theory.9 
5Martin Van Bruinessen, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam, Explaining the 
Conservative Turn, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013. 
6Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democractization in Indonesia, Pricenton: 
Princenton University Press, 2000, 218. 
7Gustav Brown, “Civic Islam: Muhammadiyah, NU and the Organisational Logic of 
Consensus-making in Indonesia”, Asian Studies Review, vol. 43, no. 2  (2019), 1-18.
8Jeremy Menchik, “Moderate Muslim and Democractic Breakdown”, Asian Studies Review, 
vol. 43, no. 2 (2019),  415-433.
9Alexander Arifianto, “Quo Vadis Civil Islam? Explaining Rising Islamism in Post-
Reformasi Indonesia”, in https://kyotoreview.org/issue-24/rising-islamism-in-post-reformasi-
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This article differentiates these previous critics by examining the role 
of both organizations amidst the rise of new media that has opened both 
the opportunity and threat dealing with Islamic teaching (dakwah) in 
Indonesia. Regarding the digital technology and Islamic proselytization, 
some scholars have discussed,10 though are, the role of Muhammadiyah 
and NU in this field. Examining their role in social media contributes 
significantly to why their voices could not be listened to on the series of 
Islamic mobilizations, locating themselves as the minority groups in the 
online activities. The three questions propose to deal with this context: 
how do they respond to Islamic teaching in the digital platform? In what 
ways do the new religious authorities play their pivotal role in attracting 
their new Islamic audiences? Comparing both Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdatul Ulama, how is the future projection on the path of moderate 
Islam within the context of the digitalization of Islamic teaching amidst the 
conservative turn in Indonesian Muslim society? This article argues that the 
new media creates anxiety within their organization members, impacting 
the different responses. 
indonesia/, accessed 25 June 2019. 
10Birgit Bräuchler, “Cyber identities at war: religion, identity, and the Internet in the 
Moluccan conflict”, Indonesia 75 (2003), 123–151; Merlyna Lim, “Archipelago Online: 
The Internet and Political Activism in Indonesia”,  Doctoral Dissertation. University 
of Twente, The Netherlands, 2005;  Bart Barendregt, “Mobile Religiosity in Indonesia: 
Mobilized Islam, Islamized Mobility and the Potential of Islamic Techno Nationalism”, 
in Erwin Alampay (ed.), Living the Information Society in Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009, 
73–92; Nadirsyah Hosen, “Online Fatwa in Indonesia: From Fatwa Shopping to Googling 
a Kiai”,  in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in 
Indonesia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, 159-173; Martin Slama, “A subtle economy of time: 
Social media and the transformation of Indonesia’s Islamic Preacher Economy”, Economic 
Anthropology, 4 (2017), 94–106; Acep Muslim, “Digital Religion and Religious Life in 
Southeast Asia: the One Day One Juz (ODOJ) Community in Indonesia”, Asianscape: 
Digital Asia, 4 (2017): 33-51; Eva F. Nisa, “Creative and Lucrative Daʿwa: The Visual 
Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia”, Asiascape: Digital 
Asia, 5 (2018), 68-99; Emma  Baulch and Pramiyanti Alilla, “Hijabers on Instagram: Using 
Visual Social Media to Construct the Ideal Muslim”, Social Media + Society, (2018),1-15.
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Feeling threatened on Islamic preachers online
By employing the concept of feeling threatened in Mujiburrahman’s work,11 
this part describes the responses of both Muhammadiyah and NU that I 
explain in the variety of the events as the representation dealing with the 
presence of online preachers and the new Islamic teaching in the digital 
platform. To begin, I started with my personal experience dealing with 
Muhammadiyah’s response. On May 27th, 2018, I was invited by the Central 
Board (Pimpinan Pusat) of Muhammadiyah in the Islamic teaching of 
Ramadhan (1439 H) to talk about Virtual Islam and the variety of Da’wah 
Digital contemporary. 
During the session of Questions and Answers, a woman in her 50s, 
coming from the Aisyiyah boards, one of the organizations under the formal 
structure of Muhammadiyah, expressed her anxiety about the emergence 
of new Islamic preachers, employing the digital platform as the Islamic 
proletarianization massively. Muhammadiyah still establishes TVMU 
(Muhammadiyah’s Television) as the medium of da’wah to catch up with 
the others of da’wah-entertainment delivered by many private televisions. 
According to her, many signs of progress had been improved by the TVMU 
on the quality programs. These conditions create a possibility to compete 
with the most prominent company of private television by offering the 
Islamic vision through Muhammadiyah’s perspective. Nevertheless, their 
11Through historical background during the two periods of the Indonesian presidency, 
mainly Sukarno and Suharto, Mujiburrahman explains how Muslim-Christian relations 
in Indonesia that caused mutual suspicion among them through the government policy. 
For the Muslims group, the presence of Christian with the agenda of Christianisation as 
well as government support through the plans was the way to alter the Indonesian Muslim 
populations. Meanwhile, for them, to establish the Islamic state would create them to be the 
second citizen in Indonesia, creating them then to be allied with the group of the military 
during the Suharto presidency. This condition then shaped feeling threatened among them, 
though the programs of interfaith dialogue, organized by some of NGOs, tried to reconcile 
them. Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.
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existence as the new agency of Islamic preaching forces Muhammadiyah’s 
members to rethink and renew their da’wah methods. 
The same feeling is happening to the members of NU that respond 
reactively through some events. In the name of saving the Indonesian 
nationalism and the hate speech prevention on the name of the infidel, and 
fight against khilafah, the NU’ members have structurally and culturally 
objected to some of the popular online preachers to deliver their Islamic 
teaching. First is the rejection of Hamid Basalamah to provide Islamic 
education in some of the places, such as in Lamongan, Sidoarjo, and 
Jakarta.12 Second, it is Felix Siauw’s objection to the Islamic teaching 
in some of the Indonesian provinces. The Waqaf Body Foundation of 
Sultan Agung in Semarang invited him to deliver the Islamic teaching on 
July 9th, 2017. Nevertheless, most of the Nahdatul Ulama of autonomous 
organizations—mainly Banser NU, PMII, IPNU, Ganaspati, and Patriot 
Garuda Nusantara—refused him. Not only because of his position as the 
religious teacher of HTI that raised suspicions about him forming the 
campaign of anti-Pancasila and anti-NKRI, but his presence could also 
cause anxiety and a horizontal conflict.13 A similar event was happened 
in the Mosque of Al-Ikhlas in Lamongan, East Java, though he finally 
insisted on delivering an Islamic speech on June 27th, 2019.14 In another 
12Duta Islam, “Provokatif, Ceramah Khalid Basalamah Ditolak Umat Islam Lamongan”, 
in https://www.dutaislam.com/2016/09/provokatif-ceramah-khalid-basalamah-ditolak-
umat-islam-lamongan.html?hl=in_ID, accessed 16 July 2019;  Nu Online, “Ini Penyebab 
Ceramah Khalid Basalamah Ditolak di Sidoarjo”, in http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/75865/
ini-penyebab-ceramah-khalid-basalamah-ditolak-di-sidoarjo-, accessed 16 July 2019; CNN 
Indonesia, “ GP Ansor Tolak Ceramah Ustaz Khalid di Masjid Hasyim Asyari”, in https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180505105126-20-295900/gp-ansor-tolak-ceramah-ustaz-
khalid-di-masjid-hasyim-asyari?, accessed 16 July 2019.
13Kumparan.com, “Tanggapan Felix Siauw Ditolak 5 Ormas di Semarang”, in https://
kumparan.com/@kumparannews/tanggapan-felix-siauw-ditolak-5-ormas-di-semarang, accessed 
16 July 2019. 
14Tribunnews.com, “Ditolak Keras Salah Satu Ormas Terbesar, Felix Siauw 
Curhat Saat Hadir di Ponpes Al-Ikhlas Lamongan”, in https://www.tribunnews.com/
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month, his Islamic teaching were also suddenly canceled by the committee 
of Fatahillah Mosque located in the Jakarta governor building while he 
was previously allowed many Islamic teaching activities.15 
Third, it is the rejection of Hanan Attaki, who was attending Islamic 
teaching that was planned in the hotel of Bahari Inn, on July 7th, 2019. 
The main reason why Imam Kharomaeni, as the local leader of GP 
Ansor, refused him by sending the objection letter to the Chief of Local 
Police Officer, was due to his Islamic teaching containing the provocative 
value. For him, some of the provocative content of Hanan Attaki’s 
Islamic teaching was, he argues, that Prophet Moses is the goon among 
the prophets.16 However, unlike the two objections, this protest has been 
responded to differently by the internal of NU’s members. One of them 
is Akhmad Sahal, for whom Hanan Attaki’s Islamic teaching is different 
and could not be invited for the radicalism thought and spreading the 
slander. Due to this objection through his twitter account on July 8th, 2019, 
he should undergo a tension among the NU’s members who are involved 
in the opposition on Hanan Attaki’s presence in Tegal. Undoubtedly, 
comparing the two of Islamic preachers, Hanan Attaki’s dakwah is 
different, approaching the youth spirit in the subculture practices and 
adjusting into the social media platform. 
Following the explanation above, one question remains: why are these 
organization members feeling threatened while on the level of members, 
infrastructure, human resources with the long periods are enormous? 
regional/2019/06/28/ditolak-keras-salah-satu-ormas-terbesar-felix-siauw-curhat-saat-hadir-di-
ponpes-al-ikhlas-lamongan, accessed 16 July 2019.
15Detik.com, “Felix Siauw Bicara Soal Kajiannya Yang Dibatalkan Pemprov DKI”, in 
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4600270/felix-siauw-bicara-soal-kajiannya-yang-dibatalkan-
pemprov-dki, accessed 16 July 2019.
16Kumparan, “Kronologi Penolakan Ustaz Hanan Attaki di Tegal oleh GP Ansor”, in 
https://kumparan.com/panturapost/kronologi-penolakan-ustaz-hanan-attaki-di-tegal-oleh-
gp-ansor-1rQGcF7kxIM, accessed 16 July 2019. 
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Muhammadiyah has an internal infrastructure that is commonly called 
AUM (Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah/Muhammadiyah Entrepreneurial 
Activities) that consists of four group activities. In detail, for educational 
activities, Muhammadiyah has 4.623 kindergartens, 2.252 elementary 
schools, 1.111 middle schools, 1.291 high schools, 71 the extraordinary 
schools (SLB), 67 Islamic boarding Schools (Pesantren), 171 colleges and 
universities. For health services that consist of hospitals, clinics, and 
maternity and pediatric in total, they have 2.119. Meanwhile, they have 
525 of social welfare that consists of the orphanage, nursing home, and 
disabled rehabilitation. Lastly, for property ownership, they have 5.080 
small mosques (Mushola), 6.118 Mosques, and land with a length of 
20.945.504 M².17 For NU, they have 28. 958 kindergartens, 59.650 the 
group of Majelis Taklim, 99 universities, 23.000 Islamic boarding schools, 
and 30 hospitals.18 
This amount will surely grow bigger due to the many NU’s members 
having their own infrastructures written as part of NU’s infrastructure 
officially. On the other hand, although they have different opinions, 
both NU and Muhammadiyah members are the biggest in Indonesia, 
compared with other Islamic organizations. As explained by Hasanuddin 
Ali through his research within the Alvara Research Center, it is estimated 
that the Indonesian Muslim who affiliated with NU is 79,04 of millions 
of people while those who are joining with Muhammadiyah are 22,46 
millions of people,19 though previously Bush predicted in 2014 that the 
members of NU were 49% and Muhammadiyah, only 7,9% from the 
17Muhammadiyah, “Data Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah”, in http://www.muhammadiyah.
or.id/id/content-8-det-amal-usaha.html, accessed 17 July 2019. 
18NU Online, “Inilah Puluhan Ribu Amal Usaha Muslimat NU”, in http://www.nu.or.
id/post/read/52377/inilah-puluhan-ribu-amal-usaha-muslimat-nu, accessed 17 July 2019.
19Hasanuddin Ali, “Menakar Jumlah Jamaah NU dan Muhamamdiyah” in https://
hasanuddinali.com/2017/01/19/menakar-jumlah-jamaah-nu-dan-muhammadiyah/, accessed 
17 July 2019.
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total of the Indonesian population.20 However, the presence of the new 
religious authorities in New Media, especially in social media, and Islamic 
websites give them to enlarge their voices, impacting the Indonesian public 
sphere’s attention.”21
The rise of the new religious authorities 
The presence of the new media with the current modes of communication 
has altered the landscape of the existence of the religious authorities’ 
establishment, causing a disruption within the society. In the Muslim 
world, it situates the “fragmenting and contesting political and religious 
authority,” between the old and the new one.22 The use of the internet 
as Islamic proselytization has faced the appropriation following the 
development of the digital platform, especially social media. In comparison 
to both Muhammadiyah and NU, many Islamic groups, whether the new 
and the old ones, have employed new media. Consequently, amidst the 
growth of the Indonesian population, especially Muslim society and the 
20Robin Bush, “A Snapshot of Muhammadiyah Social Change and Shifting Markers of 
Identity and Values”, Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series No. 221, 2014. 
21The growth of Internet users in Indonesia every year, and smartphone ownership 
strengthens the factor. According to APJII (Asosiasi Penyelanggara Jasa Penyelenggara Internet 
Indonesia/Indonesia Internet Service Provider Association), the rise of the Internet users 
is significant while it increases 10,2 % with the 27.916.716 of people from 2017 to 2018. 
In 2017, the figures of the user were 143, 26 of millions (54, 68%), while it gains 171,17 of 
millions of people (64,8%) from the total of the Indonesian population, 264, 16 of millions. 
This number of people then bridge the gap between the urban and the rural area. In the 
metropolitan area, most of the Indonesian access the Internet with a percentage of 74,1 % 
while it is 61, 6% of the users from the rural area. Most of them, with a portion of 93,9 % 
access the Internet through smartphones in daily life activities. These figures represent what 
Merlyna Lim argues on the Internet activity as Cyber-Urban Space, reflecting on “where 
contemporary urban people live much of the time, juggling multiple identities that transcend 
online and offline spheres.” On the other hand, as she suggests previously, “much of the 
early work dichotomized online/cyber/virtual life and offline/real/physical life. Merlyna Lim, 
“Cyber Urban”, In Anthony M Orum (ed), The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Urban and 
Regional Studies, New Jersey: Wiley Blackwell, 2019.  
22Merlyna Lim, “Archipelago Online: The Internet and Political Activism in Indonesia”, 
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Twente, The Netherlands, 2005, 14-15.
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development of the Internet users, they have been left behind—replaced 
with the new of these religious authorities, individually and collectively. For 
a positive reason, their presence democratizes all of Indonesian Muslims 
to choose the Islamic reference from the website that they tend to like. To 
some extent, they challenge the Indonesian foundation, mainly Pancasila 
as the form of nationality integration in Indonesia and, on the other 
hand, they propose the Islamic trans-ideology in the name of Ummah, the 
Islamic state, and the conservative tone tendency. By employing the Alexa 
and Similiar Web as the website to rank various websites in the world, 
Pusat Studi dan Perubahan Sosial (PSPS), Muhammadiyah University of 
Solo finds an exciting result on Islamic websites.  They argue that many 
Islamic websites are predominantly those Islamic forms in 2017 as a part 
of the new religious authorities. Ironically, both Muhammadiyah and NU 
could not compete with them.
   Table 1. The comparison of Islamic organization Website Rank 
based on Alexa and Similarweb23
23M. Thoyibi and Yayah Khisbiyah, Kontestasi Wacana Keislaman di Dunia Maya: Moderatisme, 
Ekstremisme, dan Hipernasionalisme, Solo: Pusat Studi dan Perubahan Sosial UMS, 2018, 91-99.
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Through table 1, in the rank of Alexa ad Similiarweb, both NU (nu.
or.id) and Muhammadiyah (suaramuhammadiyah.id) take the position 
in the number of three and ten. Meanwhile, those of Islamic website is 
dominating in the public online such as portal-Islam.id, eramuslim.com, 
hidayatullah, voa-islam.com, dakwatuna, and arrahmah.com. In other 
words, to understand something related to the practices of Islam through 
Google index, those of Islamic websites will be found by the largest 
Indonesian Muslim audience. Not only is so much information with 
Islamic material following their Islamic ideologies added, but their material 
resources have also become strong keywords, impacting the structure of 
algorithm in the Google search adjusting people’s references. This google 
algorithmic will provide much information that strongly relates to their 
preferences. In some of the crucial issues, such as both religion and political 
tension, the Indonesian Muslims’ choices will come into the algorithmic 
enclaves adjusting to their political and religious interests. It is happening 
in the Jakarta election, as explained by Merlyna Lim, leading people into 
prison for their opinion based on their preferences.24 Therefore, the main 
reason why both Muhammadiyah and NU followers do not want to listen is 
that their appeal to involve in the series of Islamic mobilization in the case 
of Ahok’s accusation blasphemy could be explained within this argument.
Regarding those Islamic websites, we could not generalize them into 
one category due to diverse forms of their content. Savic Ali’s observation 
is the essential factor in understanding their backgrounds while he divides 
into the four categories on Islamic websites, including both the websites 
of Muhammadiyah and NU. First, the ultra-conservative Islamic website 
creates the school of Islamic thought with the Salafi and Wahabi ideologies, 
proposing the Islamic orthodoxy, such as almanhaj.or.id and muslim.or.id. 
24Merlyna Lim, “Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal 
nationalism in Indonesia”, Critical Asian Studies, vol. 49, no. 3 (2017), 411–427.
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Some of their characteristics are the prohibition of music, without women’s 
pictures, and Islamic regulations dealing with sculpture in the home. Second, 
the content of Islamic politics that is in the form of ummah advocacy, such 
as eramuslim.com and voa-islam.com. Not only do these Islamic websites 
contain the oppression of Islam in the world, colonized by the West like 
the US and Europe representation, but they also narrate on the triumph 
of Islam in history to provoke their solidarity of ummah. Previously, many 
of their writers are the former of Sabily magazine journalists. Third, the 
representation of Multiculturalism is the form of moderate Islamic websites 
such as nu.or.id and suaramuhammadiyah.id. Finally, they are Islamic 
websites that gain commercial benefits through Google AdSense.25 
Meanwhile, on social media, especially on the Youtube channel, these 
new religious authorities are predominantly influencing the Indonesian 
public online, mostly coming from the Islamic stream of both Salafi and 
Wahabi, such as Yufid TV, Rodja TV, and Ammar TV. Meanwhile, both 
Muhammadiyah and NU are represented by tvMu, Aswaja Tube, NU 
Channel, and NU TV. According to Ibnu Nadzir,26 both Salafi and Wahabi 
channels are more significant in terms of the numbers of subscribers, 
25Ahmad Zaenuddin, “Kompetisi di antara berbagai situsweb Islam”, in https://tirto.id/
kompetisi-di-antara-berbagai-situsweb-islam-cEHi, accessed 17 July 2019.
26Furthermore, he explains that Yufid TV has the 491.866 of subscribers with the number 
of video content upload, mainly 7568 of the contents and the average contents monthly 
91 videos, followed by the Rodja TV with the 136.668 of subscriber numbers and 1147 of 
the video contents and monthly average 16 videos. Ammar TV has taken a position in the 
third largest with the 405.345 of subscribers and 1047 of video contents, and the average 
of video monthly 27 items. On the other hand, tvMu is the highest rank among the other 
Islamic moderate channel with the 7.173 subscribers and the 2097 of the video contents with 
the average monthly 45 videos, followed by Aswaja Tube in the second number with the 
47.324 of subscribers and the 992 of the videos, while every month on average is 19 videos 
uploading. Both NU Channel and NUTV in the fourth and fifth position with 349 and 
2.761 of subscribers and 23-314 of the content videos in the average content between 8-11 
videos monthly. Ibnu Nadzir, “Da’wa 2.0: The Mediation of Preaching on Salafi’s Internet 
Practices”, paper presented on the conference “Religious Authority in Indonesian Islam: 
Contestation, Pluralization, and New Actors”, ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak, Singapore, 3-4 July 2018. 
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content, and the average content monthly, surpassing the channels of 
both Muhammadiyah and NU. 
Table 2. Islamic Religious Authorities on Youtube Channel27
No Channel
Number of 
Subscriber
First Upload
Number 
Contents
Average 
content 
per 
month
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Yufid TV
Rodja TV
Ammar TV
tvMU
Aswaja Tube
NU Channel
NUTV
491.866
136.668
405.345
7.173
47.324
349
2.761
1 March 2011
26 January 2012
8 November 2014
31 March 2014
9 October 2013
21 November 2017
15 September 2015
7568
1147
1067
2097
992
23
314
91
16
27
45
19
8
11
On Instagram, these new religious authorities are also influenced 
primarily by their followers. The chosen Instagram as their Islamic 
proselytization could definitely be explained on the target audience, 
while most of Youth Muslim in the age group of 15-30 years. Among 
them is Abdul Somad as the highest of followers on Instagram with the 
9, 7 million, though his account has disappeared and been replaced with 
the new one, @ustadabdulsomadofficial. Hanan Attaki takes the second 
position with the 7, 4 millions of followers, followed by Felix Siauw and 
Adi Hidayat, with 4 million and 2 million followers, respectively. Both 
Khalid Basalamah and Syafiq Riza Basalamah are in the middle positions 
with 999.000 followers and its 933.000 members. The last rank has been 
achieved by Handy Bony and Evie Efendi that consist of 324.000 followers 
27Ibnu Nadzir, “Da’wa 2.0: The Mediation of Preaching on Salafi’s Internet Practices”, 
paper presented on the conference “Religious Authority in Indonesian Islam: Contestation, 
Pluralization, and New Actors”, ISEAS-Yusuf Ishak, Singapore, 3-4 July 2018. 
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and 16,600 followers.
Table 3. The Amount of New Religious Authorities’ 
Followers on Instagram
No Instagram Account Name Followers
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
@ustadzabdulsomad
@hanan_attaki
@felixsiauw
@ustadadihidayat
@khalidbasalamahofficial
@syafiqrizabasalamah_official
@oemar_mita
@handy.bonny
@evieefendie
Abdul Somad
Hanan Attaki 
Felix Siauw
Adi Hidayat 
Khalid Basalamah
Syafiq Riza Basalamah
Oemar Mita
Handy Bonny
Evie Efendie
9, 7 million
7, 4 million 
4 million 
2 million
999 thousand
933 thousand
698 thousand 
324 thousand
16.6 thousand
 The provided information explains that the new religious 
authorities command the Indonesian public sphere in the new media that 
consists of three factors. They are the Islamic website, audio-visual through 
Islamic videos on Youtube, and Instagram as the highest of Indonesian 
youth users on the platform of social media. In comparison to the previous 
Islamic proselytization through the print media, television, radio, and 
cassette that need more the capitalist economy to build, the new media—as 
an Islamic preaching medium—could be economical. It causes them to 
emerge into the Indonesian public sphere vastly. Both consistency and 
innovation are other factors that are successful in attracting the Indonesian 
Muslim people.  
 Also, the quality of visual aesthetics and communication approach is 
humble and interactive and encourage people to watch, subscribe, and follow. 
The strategy of good marketing they employ by adjusting to the background 
of their audience target is another factor to consider. Through their Islamic 
proselytization, Indonesian public Islam has been reshaped, causing to 
redefine Indonesian Islam. Not only is Indonesian Islam driven through their 
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 1, June 2020: 1-24
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perspective, but the power of the new media in their hands also enforces the 
position of moderate Indonesian Muslims that previously had the optimism 
in the future as Hefner’s word predicted. Sadly, the power of their social media 
amplification could create the unholy allies with the politico-entrepreneur. The 
two cases with different results are exemplary, mainly the Jakarta election (2017) 
as a success to defeat Ahok, who is the incumbent of Jakarta governor through 
the exploitation of religious sentiments and the failure of the presidential 
election (2019) to win Prabowo. This was to replace Jokowi as the Indonesian 
president in the first term (2014-2019). 
Conclusion 
The influence of the new religious authorities creates the feeling of threat, 
as explained earlier. Although both NU and Muhammadiyah have the same 
awareness, they respond differently. While Muhammadiyah acknowledges 
it calmly, NU responds to it reactively. Admittedly, there are many aspects 
behind their different responses. Islamic ideology background, the 
environment of structure organization, and the basis of their members 
are geographically the three factors that I would like to explain within 
this discussion by providing the two perspectives on these organizations. 
The words of Abdul Mu’ti, Muhammadiyah Secretary-General, on 
the presence of Hijrah Fest activities organized by these new religious 
authorities could be a reference to understanding Muhammadiyah’s 
response. For him, the presence of the new religious authorities through 
social media, as well as hijrah fest, is an interesting socio-religious interesting 
phenomenon. It becomes a positive trend and the new stream of the 
Islamic movement, specifically following the previous trend that was 
hype in the past. There were, for instance, such as Ari Ginanjar with the 
ESQ Training and Yusuf Mansur with one day one ayat and its religious 
meal (sedekah) movement. Due to the only trend, they could not be the 
mainstream of Islamic movement, except they have influential prominent 
17
The demise of moderate Islam: new media, contestation, and reclaiming religious... (Wahyudi Akmaliah)
figures consistently.28 However, he sets the alarm softly for those Muslims 
who are studying Islam in the digital application, given that many Islamic 
teachings on social media do not give clear references, no Islamic teacher 
who guides them. They also provide a limited time of around 2-5 minutes. 
Consequently, they will get the wrong information and, furthermore, it 
could cause new problems.29 
Therefore, instead of employing social media, Muhammadiyah prefers to 
choose the conventional way for young Muslims to understand and to study 
Islam by meeting up personally. For him, practicing Islamic proselytization 
will traditionally obtain the deep meaning, and the material content could 
be responsibly compared to learning Islam via social media. Therefore, 
for him, Muhammadiyah is different from the Islamic teaching approach. 
Although on the level of prevention of Islamic teaching, Muhammadiyah 
still prepares it knowing that they have discussed it internally. According 
to Benni Setiawan, the members of the leadership center Muhammadiyah 
cadre committee, some of Muhammadiyah universities have gotten a 
job in their contribution to handling some issues. He argues that they 
should establish the big data, aiming to understand and to map out the 
Muhammadiyah members in all of the Indonesian provinces. Indeed, 
Haedar Nashir, the chairman of Muhammadiyah has invited the two of 
Muhammadiyah cadres who have expertise in this issue. In many moments, 
Haedar has often reminded the  Muhammadiyah cadres to establish the 
centers of excellence, especially having the big data as the center of digital 
Islamic proselytization.30
28Republika.co.id, “Mu’ti: Hijrah Fest Fenomena Sosial Keagamaan Yang Menarik”, in 
https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/18/11/12/pi2hxl384-muti-
hijrah-fest-fenomena-sosial-keagamaan-yang-menarik, accessed in 18 July 2019. 
29CNN Indonesia, “Anak Muda Hijrah di mata NU dan Muhammadiyah”, in https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190516190532-20-395594/anak-muda-hijrah-di-mata-
nu-dan-muhammadiyah, accessed in 18 July 2019.
30Benni Setiawan, “Dakwah Pencerahan Era Digital”, in https://investor.id/archive/
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As a result, Muhammadiyah creates the application in the play store, such 
as TVMu for the online television, Tarjih as the digital of praying guideline 
and Islamic law content in Muhammadiyah’s perspective, Muvon for the 
application in order to live with the halal life, and Edumu for the material 
studies in Muhammadiyah’s curriculum system, and messengerMu for the 
communication and online chatting.31 On the Islamic website, there are 
64 websites that are affiliated with Muhammadiyah.32
For Dadang Kahmad, these ways on how Muhammadiyah should 
involve the popular Islamic preacher instantly, while many of their 
Islamic resources could not be yet responsible—it is also considered 
Muhammadiyah’s challenges. By creating these Islamic digital products 
through the apps, he hopes that Islamic preachers from Muhammadiyah 
do not often come to many places. Still, they could employ social media 
to gain many Indonesian young people largely.33  
Although the digital dakwah is  the part of response on the new religious 
authorities, those products mostly deliver to the Muhammadiyah members 
in Indonesia, instead of resisting the rise of new Islamic actors. It seems that 
Muhammadiyah tries to avoid the conflict compared to a face-to-face fight 
with these new Islamic authorities. Nevertheless, establishing the front of 
the Islamic website, generally in the sense of Muhammadiyah, has been a 
struggle for some of Muhammadiyah’s young militant cadres. They have 
previously been involved in social activities for years. The emergence of 
dakwah-pencerahan-era-digital, accessed 16 July 2019. 
31Republika.co.id, “Sasar Milennial, Muhammadiyah Perkuat Konten Dakwah Digital”, in 
https://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/19/02/15/pmz1ly320-
sasar-milenial-muhammadiyah-perkuat-konten-dakwah-digital, accessed in 18 July 2019.
32Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah Jawa Timur, Daftar Website Terafiliasi 
Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah”, in https://pwmu.co/daftar-website-terafiliasi-persyarikatan-
muhammadiyah/, accessed in 18 July 2019.
33Republika.co.id, “Sasar Milennial, Muhammadiyah Perkuat Konten Dakwah Digital”, in 
https://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/19/02/15/pmz1ly320-
sasar-milenial-muhammadiyah-perkuat-konten-dakwah-digital, accessed in 18 July 2019.
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Ibtimes.id as the new Islamic website is one of those. Content, whether 
on the level of the quality and quantity, should improve to attract most 
of the Indonesian Muslim viewers. 
In my argument, between Muhammadiyah and these new religious 
authorities, there is a similar ideology and a base of their followers 
geographically. Inspired by Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) as an Islamic 
theologian, Muhammadiyah has been struggling to purify the Islamic 
faith by practicing the dakwah method, such as an unforgiving attitude 
towards takhayyul (superstition), bid‘ah (innovation) and churafat/
khurāfah  (unorthodoxy). Those are not historically evident with the Islamic 
tradition and the two primary resources, mainly Al-Quran and Hadits. 
Besides, this organization has also been inspired by Muhammad Abduh 
(1849-1905), to rationalize and to modernize their religious belief within 
education34 through the establishment of many schools, and universities 
in all Indonesian provinces. 
While most of the new religious authorities adopt their Ideological 
aspirations from the Islamic organizations and their prominent figures, 
they have many similarities with the apparent differences in many aspects. 
The place geographically consists of urban areas. This is another argument 
to understand their basic similarities on the base of their followers. 
Hence, the resistance of these new figures could not work reactively. The 
characteristic organization with the social administrations as the full 
activities for their guidelines is another reason why they could not mobilize 
freely although they feel threatened like NU.
In contrast, the establishment of NU in Java in the 1920s was to resist 
“the plan of Saudi Arabia, guided by Wahhabi ideology, to destroy graves 
and other cultural traditions in Mecca and Medina.” By respecting the 
34Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Pluralism, Liberalism, and Islamism: Religious Outlook of 
Muhammadiyah”, Studia Islamika, Vol.25 No.23, 2018, 436-437.
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culture and its locality, NU then combines between Islamic values and 
their Indonesian culture and social heritage. To strengthen their identities, 
their idea of developing Islam Nusantara since 2015 has previously been 
taken from Gus Dur’s knowledge on the Pribumisasi Islam (indigenization 
of Islam) that was introduced in the 1980s and has become NU’s people as 
the software to resist the Islamic trans ideology in Indonesia. The software 
then becomes their spirit to oppose and to fight against it as well as to 
provide such kind of the face of Islamic religious expression that could be 
adaptable with the Indonesian context, socially, culturally, and politically.35 
Therefore, the response has a historical background in the past. It is also 
like body immunity through the establishment of Islam Nusantara as their 
software imaginatively in the current years. Besides, their background 
is mostly coming to the rural place geographically as the base of NU 
members, which is undoubtedly another factor to redefine their Islamic 
identity amidst the enforcement of the urbanization of Indonesia, while 
the Islamisation from the urban people challenges their Islamic identity. 
The first thing they should do is strengthening their website, mainly 
NU Online, by improving the various of the contents and visualizing 
the pictures with an impressive design. Instead of asking for the highest 
payment, most of them work voluntarily with the spirit of fighting against 
the Wahabi ideology, although in the beginning, they had no strength 
of capability. According to Hamzah Sahal, the founder of Alif.id, to 
establish and to maintain the NU Online relies on the same vision with 
the networks and their dedications.36 After a few years of hard work, 
their website could surpass those Islamic websites after the long years of 
35Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Islam Nusantara as A Promosing Response to Religious 
Intolerance and Radicalism”, Trends in Southeast Asia, 21, Iseas-Yusuf Ishak, Singapore, 2018, 
36Hamzah Sahal, “Mengapa NU Online Mengalahkan Web-web Islam Puritan”, in 
https://alif.id/read/hamzah-sahal/mengapa-nu-online-mengalahkan-web-web-islam-puritan-
b214962p/, accessed in 18 July 2019.
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domination in the Google search engine. Not only are they strengthening 
their Islamic website, they have also created the two Islamic websites to 
challenges those of the new religious authorities collectively, mainly Islami.
co, and BincangSyariah.com. Surprisingly, NU Online stands at the first 
position surpassing mulism.or.id and almanhaj.or.id. Meanwhile, their 
new Islamic websites steeply come into the 20 ranks, mainly Islami.co in 
the number of 10 ranks, and Bincangsyariah.com in the name of 16 levels.
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